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In this paper, I critically assess the thesis that the discovery of mirror neuron systems (MNSs) provides empirical support for the simulation theory (ST) of social cognition. This thesis can be analyzed into two claims: 

(i)  MNSs are involved in understanding others’ intentions or emotions. 
(ii) The way in which they do so supports a simulationist viewpoint. 

I will be giving qualified support to both (i) and (ii). Starting with (i), I will present theoretical and empirical points in support of the view that MNSs play a substantial role and are perhaps neces​sary although not sufficient for understanding at least some intentions or emo​tions. Turning to (ii), I will argue that the work on MNSs best supports a fairly weak version of ST, according to which social cognition involves simulation simply because conceptual thought in gen​eral has a simulationist component. In elucidating this idea, I appeal to Law​rence Barsalou’s embodied theory of concepts (1999, 2005). Crucially, the term “simula​tion” here refers not to simulations of a target agent’s experience, nor even spe​cifically to one’s own experience in a similar counterfactual situation, but to simulations of experience in general - activating sensory, motor, proprioceptive, affective, and introspective representations that match representations one would have when perceiving, carrying out actions, experiencing emotions, etc. I then sketch an expanded simulationist framework for understanding the contribution of MNSs to social cognition. The ap​peal to empirical work on MNSs in support of ST is therefore a two-edged sword; making this appeal persuasive requires us to modify our understanding of simulation to make it line up with the empirical work.  

2. Mirror neurons and understanding intentions and emotions

2.1 Mirror neurons and mirror neuron systems: some terminological remarks

Mirror neurons are a class of neurons with a particular kind of first- and third-person matching profile. Mirror neurons in the motoric domain, for example, are active when one is deciding upon, planning or performing an action, and also when one is observing another agent acting​[1]​. Outside of the motoric domain, there are neurons that have the same kind of profile, i.e. they are active when one is having an affective or sensory experience, on the one hand, or when one is observing someone else having an affective or tactile experience on the other​[2]​. Since it is not generally possible to do single-cell studies in humans, it is not yet firmly established that there are individual MNs outside the motoric domain. Some people therefore prefer to speak of a mirror neuron system (MNS). This term has the added benefit of emphasizing that the functioning of these neurons depends upon their integration in larger circuits. One downside of this term is that it implies that all mirror neurons belong to one system, whereas we cannot rule out the possibility that there are numerous MNSs, or that different groups of MNs could belong to different systems. With this cautionary proviso, I will use the term MNS except where I explicitly mean individual neurons or where I want to avoid pre-judging the number of systems involved.

2.2 Are MNSs sufficient?
There are plenty of theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt that a matching relation in the sense of mirroring could suffice for understanding intentions or emotions. Let me start with two theoretical considerations. The first has to do with action understanding and thus with the motor mirror​ing. Action understanding appears to require a more abstract kind of representa​tion (i.e. conceptual processing) than motor representation, since one action can be carried out with different movements and different actions can be carried out with one and the same movement in different contexts (e.g. Jacob and Jeannerod 2005). Note that it is not clear whether this objection applies to understanding emo​tions by mirroring. The second theoretical consideration is that understanding an intention or an emotion involves ascription of a representa​tion of that intention or that emotion – simply mirroring (being in the same state as) as someone else does not count as understanding that that state refers to them rather than to oneself (e.g. Goldman 2006).

There is also plenty of empirical work that casts doubt on robust interpretations of MNSs. I will just mention one widely cited study here to give you the flavor. Brass et al. (2007) used fMRI to measure brain activity in human subjects watching videos of an actor performing unusual actions, such as using her knee to turn on a light. The videos differed with respect to the ease with which the action could be interpreted. In one set, the actor had her hands full, so it was ob​vious why she was using her knee. In the other, her hands were free, so the use of her knees was opaque. The authors argue that the latter condition should acti​vate any system involved in action understanding more than the former condi​tion, since it is a more challenging case for action understanding. And it turned out not to be areas associated with MNSs but areas associated with context-sensi​tive inferential processes of rationalization or mentalizing that are based on the visual processing of the stimuli – STS, TPJ, aFMC (anterior fronto-median cor​tex) and pCC (posterior cingulate cortex). They conclude that MNSs are not substantially involved in understanding global or prior intentions.

2.3 Are MNSs necessary?

As compelling as these critical considerations are, they are still compatible with the view that MNSs are crucially involved in understanding intentions and emo​tions, e.g. that they are necessary although not sufficient for understanding at least some intentions and/or emotions. What would motivate such a view? Focusing on actions for the moment, one may object to a strict theoretical distinction between repre​sentations of intentions and representations of motor plans for realizing intentions. Theoretically, it seems more parsimonious to suppose that the representation of a intention includes at least a representation of a motor plan rather than be​ing a distinct, wholly abstract representation. So, granted that matching activation in the motor system is not sufficient for identifying intentions, it may still be involved in identification, i.e. in combination with other processes.

I will mention a few empirical studies that indeed suggest that this is the case. In an experiment conducted by Hamilton and Grafton (2006), areas having neural groups with mirroring properties, in particular the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), were found to habituate to repeated actions even if those actions are performed with slightly different movements, but not to the repeated movements constituting different actions. This suggests a higher level of representation than mere representation of bodily kinematics. Why should this be the case is if they are not making any contribution to action understanding? 

A skeptic might respond that MNS activation may be correlated with understanding intentions or emotions because it is caused by understanding rather than causally contributing to understanding. The claim that MNSs make a causal contribution would be supported either by finding (i) that individuals who are poor at social cognition have compromised MNSs or (ii) that people whose motor systems or emotional experience is compromised are impaired at understanding the corresponding actions or emotions of others. There is some support for both of these predictions.  

As for (i), EEG studies have shown that mu rhythm suppression – likely an indicator of MNS activity – does not occur in autistic individuals (who have social-cognitive deficits). It has also been found that the severity of autism is correlated with the degree of abnormality in MNS activation. Moreover, autistic individuals trained to suppress their own mu rhythms improve markedly at tests of social cognition (Oberman et al. 2005, Pineda et al. 2008). This suggests a more substantial role for MNSs in action understanding. 

As for (ii), there are some studies linking impaired motor skills to some impaired conceptual abilities. Parkinson’s patients, for example, are slower to process sentences with action verbs than with other kinds of verbs (Boulenger et al., 2008).  Moreover, experiments on normal healthy individuals corroborate this assertion of a causal link between MNSs and social cognition.  For example, modulating areas of the motor system known to have MNs (Broca’s area)  by introducing “transient lesions” with TMS can cause subjects to have difficulties imitating observed actions, even if they do not have difficulties performing the actions when told to do so in non-imitative scenarios (Iacoboni 2008, 91).

In the affective domain, the evidence is even stronger. The basic emotion that has been researched most extensively is disgust, which is relatively easy to trigger in the laboratory. Wicker et al. (2003) found an overlap in activation between scenarios where subjects experienced foul odors and when they saw others sniffing the same foul odors. That this overlap is essential for understanding that the target person is experiencing disgust is implied by the fact that two subjects who cannot experience disgust because of a lesion in IFO are also impaired in their ability to recognize disgust in others (Adolphs et al. 2003). Pain has also been studied relatively extensively. Numerous studies have shown that the same areas are activated in third-person scenarios. For example, Singer et al. (2004) found this sort of affect mirroring when subjects were informed via a symbol on a screen that their romantic partner was receiving a painful stimulus (note that they observed neither the pain-inducing event nor the facial expression of pain. 

3. Mirror Neuron Systems and Simulation Theory

I have so far been discussing the first of the two claims set out in the introduction, i.e. that MNSs contribute to social cognition, and have defended the position that they are likely necessary but not sufficient. Now I will turn to the second claim, i.e. that the way in which they do so supports ST.  

3.1 Varieties of Simulation Theory

The common denominator of the various versions of ST is: predicting and/or understanding others’ actions and/or emotions involves undergoing (simulating) the same procedures that we would undergo if we ourselves were deciding upon, planning or executing an action in the same circumstances or experiencing the same emotion. In other words, the common ground shared by all versions of ST is to predict the kind of first-/ third-person matching relation that MNSs appear to constitute. Note that there is no version of ST that merely asserts such a matching relation and leaves it at that. All versions indeed make room for concepts to be involved (although they differ about whether mental concepts are prerequisites to simulation), and also include an account of ascription, i.e. how the simulated mental processes are separated from one’s own mental processes and understood to refer to the observed agent. Hence, neither Goldman nor Gordon has any problem with MNSs being insufficient, i.e. with other brain areas being involved in social cognition in addition to MNSs. The question I will focus on addresses their common ground: do MNSs really instantiate the right kind of matching relation to support ST? 


3.2 ST and MNSs

To address this question, let me start by calling attention to a specific feature of the prediction of a matching relation between first-and third-person scenarios. ST predicts that predicting or understanding someone else's actions (or emotions) involves undergoing some of the same first-order states and processes as one would undergo if one were planning/carrying out the same action (having the same emotion, etc.) as the person being observed. This is in fact a more specific claim than is justified by the definition of MNSs given above. MNSs are neurons that are active when one is planning/ carrying out an action or having an emotion, on the one hand, or observing an action/emotion on the other – but not necessarily the same action or the same emotion. Surely this is suggested by the term “mirror neuron”, and surely it is what most people assume, but it turns out not to be entirely clear that this is the case.

To see why, consider an argument raised by Csibra. Csibra (2008) points out that only a subset of MNs is strictly congruent. Strictly congruent MNs fire when observing or performing one and the same action (same type of grasp and same object). Many other MNs are responsive to multiple actions. They may be active during the execution of only one action but active during the observation of several actions, or active during the execution of several actions but to the observation of only one action. Beyond this, many MNs fire when one action is executed or when a functionally related action is observed. Taken together, they constitute the class of “broadly congruent” MNs. Altogether, broadly congruent MNs make up something like 60% or 70% of all MNs. The upshot of Csibra’s criticism here is that only the strictly congruent MNs would successfully match an observed action with the activity patterns that are present when the same action is executed. If understanding an action involves (or, more robustly, just means) being in state that one is in when performing the action, then MNs are a highly unreliable means of understanding. So, if MNs have anything to do with understanding others’ intention, it is – at least for most MNs – not by mirroring.   

Many people, such as Csibra himself (Csibra 2008, Jacob 2008), conclude that MNSs do not play a role in identifying or ascribing intentions (they do not say much about emotion mirroring or emotions), but perhaps in predicting the ongoing motor realization of prior intentions, which are ascribed by other means. In proposing this Jacob and Csibra preserve a key simulationist idea, namely that the observer’s decision-making and action-planning resources are employed when she seeks to predict the agent’s behavior, and in fact MNSs are thereby granted a role in social cognition that accords with ST. But they are not playing a role in ascription of an intention and, as already noted, they are not mirroring.  

How well does this interpretation fit the data? It does fit well with the observation that most so-called MNs are congruent in a broad rather than a narrow sense. But it is crucially important to know just what those broadly congruent MNs are doing if not mirroring in a narrow sense, That is, does their activation correspond to activation that would be present in the observer’s brain if she were carrying out an action likely to follow upon the presently observed action? If so, that would support the idea that they have a predictive function. This may be the case, but I know of no data which would support this proposal. Moreover, there are other alternatives for which there is supporting data.  Jacob’s and Csibra’s proposals would not be well supported, for example, if MN activation corresponded to activation that would be present if the observer were preparing a complementary response. As it happens, there is data that suggests that this may be the case.  For example, Newman-Norlund et al. (2007) found that the “human mirror neuron system” (specifically: right inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior parietal lobes) is more active when observers are simultaneously preparing a complementary action than when they are preparing an imitative action. They take this finding to suggest that the function of these neurons lies in “dynamically coupling action observation to action execution”. Note that, if this is the case, they would not be simulating the observed agent’s movement or intention in the sense of ST, but would nevertheless be important for social cognition. Would they still be simulating in any interesting sense?

In fact, there is a related usage of the term simulation which would apply quite well here.  The idea is that MNs could enable the interpreter to simulate the experience of performing some other action which is related to the observed action or some other emotional state which is related to the observed emotional state, for example an appropriate response.  In this case, one would still be simulating an experience, and this simulation may still be used in understanding the other person’s intention or emotion, but clearly the kind of simulation at issue in this sort of case is further removed from the idea that we simulate the other person’s experience as they act or have an emotion. I will call this kind of simulation “extended simulation”.

Note that these various alternatives are compatible. Some MNS circuits could be mirroring in the narrow sense while some broadly congruent MNS circuits could be serving predictive functions and some other ones response-selective functions. Indeed, recalling the Newman-Norlund (2007) results mentioned above, one may make the case that they in fact support the view that MNSs have multiple functions (.i.e. mirroring and response-selection). After all, one might argue, performing a complementary action involves mirroring plus an additional task, so it is no wonder that there is more activation in the complementary action scenario than in the scenario where there is only imitation, which involves minimal additional burdens beyond mirroring. The results, properly considered, suggest that MNSs have a response-selective function in addition to the function of mirroring the observed agent’s intention or emotion.

In fact, there are other studies that fit well with this interpretation. For example, Iacoboni (2008, 127-128) reports a study of mothers’ responses to pictures of babies expressing emotions. Unsurprisingly, there were stronger responses in mirror neuron areas and also in emotional brain centers (insula and amygdala) when looking at pictures of their own babies as opposed to other babies. What is interesting is that there was also increased activation in the pre-SMA, which is anatomically linked closely with MNS areas, and seems to control and modulate MNS activation. The pre-SMA is an “important region for complex motor planning and motor sequencing – that is, for putting together a series of concatenated actions” (Iacoboni 2008, 128) – i.e. for actions more complex than the mere facial expressions they are observing and mirroring. Iacoboni’s gloss is that the mothers’ MNSs are (motorically and emotionally) mirroring and that this mirroring activity additionally “triggers a whole cascade of other automatic simulative brain responses”, which may in turn increase MNS activation further (Iacoboni 2008, 129). Note that Iacoboni uses the term “simulative” for this response-selection process in the sense of “extended simulation”: let me clarify this term and elucidate its connection with simulation in the sense of ST.  

4. An expanded simulationist framework

4.1 Simulationist theories of concepts

Let me start by saying a bit about simulationist theories of concepts. The basic idea is that conceptual thought, rather than taking place in an amodal symbolic code such as a “language of thought”, involves the same modality-specific neural activity as perception. Let me give a simple example to illustrate Barsalou’s theory. When one sees a car, neural feature detectors are active in the visual system. Conjunctive neurons in a nearby area conjoin the active features and store them in memory. These sets of conjunctive neurons also account for the trans-modal nature of concepts, namely by integrating the feature detection activity that occurred during visual perception of the car with feature detection activity that was active in other modality-specific systems, such as the auditory system. Later on, when one reasons about the car or about cars in general, the conjunctive neurons activate the neurons in the visual system and/or in other modality-specific systems that were active when the car was perceived, thereby simulating the sensory perception of the car. Barsalou indeed calls the networks that coordinate re-activation of multimodal representations “simulators”.

Simulators can include, alongside perceptual representations, also motor representations, proprioception, and what Barsalou calls “introspection,” by which he means representation of one’s own emotions and other internal states, as well as representation of one’s own cognitive processes. This is important because it enables us to see how MNSs could be linked up with other types of representation in contributing to understanding intentions and emotions. Focusing on intentions for a moment, activation in perceptual areas plus activation in motor areas give a representation of a movement and of a context. Although neither is sufficient on its own to understand an intention, such a constellation of various kinds of representation linked up by Hebbian learning may indeed be sufficient, and may make the appeal to abstract symbols or theoretical inferences superfluous. This goes a long way to addressing the issue of what role MNSs could play in understanding intentions or emotions, which, as I have noted, is more abstract than mere mirroring. But is there a limit to the level of abstraction that can be accounted for by a perception-based theory of concepts?

4.2 Expanded simulation and abstractness

Although I am not confident that Barsalou can explain highly abstract concepts satisfactorily, at least some of the elements of his theory may be applied to the concepts that feature centrally in social cognition. For example, Barsalou ascribes a prominent role to introspection in abstract concepts. In discussing introspection, Barsalou speaks of proprioception, representation of one’s emotion states, and representation of what he calls “cognitive operations”, including “rehearsal, elaboration, search, retrieval, comparison, and transformation” (1999, 585). I would like to say a bit about each of these.

To start with proprioception, Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) found that, when asked to list typical features of concepts, subjects cited more introspective contents for abstract concepts than for concrete concepts. So, for example, people would be more likely to mention hunger when listing features for FOOD than for specific kinds of food, such as CHEESE. This is intuitively plausible: where concrete perceptible features are not readily available, people tend to attend to introspectable internal states.

Turning to emotions, Barsalou gives the example of ANGER. The concept of ANGER involves the recollected introspection (simulation) of one’s own past affective state(s) of anger. This recollected introspection content could be combined with other components in simulating anger. A simulation, then, may also activate perceptions of angry-behavior, and perhaps also typical cognitive operations underlying judgments typically associated with ANGER, such as the judgment that a given action has caused harm or was unfair.

As for the third sort of introspection that Barsalou mentions, namely representation of one’s cognitive processes, I will mention the example of metacognition. The term “metacognition” refers to cognitive monitoring and control of first-order cognitive processes. In other words, it refers to cognitive processes that target other cognitive processes as opposed to events or properties in the world. The targeted cognitive processes include judging the adequacy of a particular response, correcting that response, evaluating one’s ability to carry out a particular task, evaluating the ease or difficulty of learning some new information or of recalling some previously learned information (Proust 2006, 18-19). 





I have defended the thesis that the discovery of MNSs constitutes empirical support for ST by corroborating a prediction made by ST. This has involved affirming two claims: (i) that MNSs are involved in social cognition and (ii) that they do so in a way that instantiates simulation. With respect to (i), I have argued that MNSs are likely to be substantially involved in (perhaps necessary for) understanding many intentions and emotions, although they are not likely to be sufficient. 

As for (ii), I have tried to show that much of the work on MNSs in fact fits best with a slightly different simulationist framework, which is broader and therefore weaker than ST. This is the sense of simulation employed in “simulationist” theories of concepts, such as that espoused by Barsalou (1999, 2005). According to such theories, conceptual thought in general has a simulationist component, but the term simulation here refers not to simulations of a target’s experience, nor even specifically to one’s own experience in a similar counterfactual situation, but to simulations of one’s one past experiences in general - activating sensory, motor, proprioceptive, affective, and introspective representations that match representations one would have when perceiving, carrying out actions, experiencing emotions, etc. My suggestion is the following: instances of mirroring that instantiate simulation in the sense of ST are a special case of a broader class of phenomena that instantiate simulation in the sense of Barsalou. Although this requires simulation theorists to modify their understanding of simulation to make it line up with the empirical work, it also allows them to embed ST into a broader framework, thereby increasing theoretical scope and making available a broader base of empirical data.  
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^1	  For an overview, see Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004.
^2	  Goldman 2006 reviews and dicusses the work on affect mirroring, Bastiaansen et al 2009 the work on mirroring of tactile sensations.
